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COMMENT
NOTICE BY POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY
v. RECORD TITLE
Been Abrogated in Indiana?
Has the Rule that Open and Notorious Possession of Real Estate
under an Unrecorded Contract is Notice to Third Persons Been Abrogated in Indiana?
By HARVEY B. HARTSOCK-

The case of Mishawaka, St. Joseph Loan & Trust Co., et al. v. Neu,
et al., 196 N. E. 85 (Ind. Supreme Court, May 24, 1935), if followed,
will be the historic case which, for Indiana, ended the rule that open
and notorious possession of real estate under an unrecorded contract
for acquiring title to, or interest in, the same is notice to third persons;
the case which made it unnecessary for a purchaser, mortgagee or lessee to inspect the premises to ascertain whether anyone is in possession
thereof claiming rights under unrecorded instruments and authorized
one acquiring title to, or interest in, real estate to rely solely upon the
record, in the absence of actual bad faith on his part.
Those interested in the Indiana history of the above-mentioned
rule may find it in Moreland v. Lemasters, 4 Blackford 383; Earle v.
Peterson, 67 Ind. 503; Barnes v. Union School Township, 91 Ind. 301;
South Side State Bank v. Snyder, 92 Ind. App. 433, 176 N. E. 52.
The wide adoption of such rule throughout the United States is
revealed by the following notes: 20 R. C. L. 342, 27 R. C. L. 726,
87 A. L. R. 1529; and by cases therein cited.
Through the ages prior to recording statutes, one's rights in property depended upon his acquiring and maintaining possession thereof.
Much could be written about the adoption and development of statutes requiring recording of written instruments evidencing title to, or
interest in, real estate in this and other countries. Even the history
of the section of the statute cited in and governing the instant case,
shows the tendency to rely more upon records and less upon possession.
From 1852 to 1875, this statute gave 90 days for recording before the
instrument would be "fraudulent and void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee in good faith and for a valuable consideration."
Between 1875 and 1913, such period was only 45 days. Since the
amendment of 1913, "every conveyance, mortgage or lease shall take
priority according to the time of the filing thereof, and such conveyance, mortgage or lease shall be fraudulent and void as against any
subsequent purchaser, lessee or mortgagee in good faith and for a
valuable consideration, having his deed, mortgage or lease first recorded." The elimination of the "45 days" provision, leaves the one
* Of the IndianapoIis Bar.

RECENT CASE NOTES

who is tardy in recording his instrument only the remedy of proving
absence of good faith or of consideration on the part of the one who
has first filed his deed, mortgage or lease.
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Mishawaka, St. Joseph Loan
& Trust Company v. Neu, one presenting a deed, mortgage or lease for
recording, must at his peril know the rights of anyone then in open
and notorious possession of the real estate involved and his failure
to ascertain and know the same could be used as proof of his lack of
"good faith" in an action to enforce his rights by the one in possession.
In this case, a casual inspection of the premises by the mortgagee four
days before the execution of the mortgage was deemed by the Supreme
Court sufficient evidence of "good faith" on the part of the mortgagee
in the absence of proof of its actual knowledge of any rights or interest in the property by plaintiffs who had contracted to purchase the
property of the mortgagor, paid part of the purchase price and had
moved into the premises two days before the mortgage was signed and
was in open and notorious possession thereof when the mortgage was
executed and recorded.
If the decision in this case remains the law of this state, it will
simplify the questions involved in taking title to, or an interest in, real
estate. The one acquiring the same need look only to the record in
the absence of actual notice to him that there is one in possession of
the same who may claim rights or interests therein contrary to his.
But the plaintiffs in this case, who had to act without the benefit of
the Supreme Court's decision therein, doubtless feel that although they
acted under the law as it was, their case was decided under the law
as the court thought it should be. Transitions are seldom made without injury to someone.
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This was a suit by the life beneficiary of a trust to get such an interpretation
of the trust agreement as would compel the trustee to treat stock dividends
received upon shares held in the trust as income to go to such life beneficiary. The trustee had, in the absence of any specific expression of the
settlor's in respect to stock dividends, treated such dividends as principal
belonging to the corpus of the trust. Held, that stock dividends received upon
shares held in trust are principal and not income distributable among life
beneficiaries. 1 This question had never before been passed upon by the
Indiana courts.
In determining who is entitled to a stock dividend upon shares held in
trust, as between the life tenant and remainderman, it is generally held that
the intent of the settlor must govern, if sufficiently indicated in the trust
instrument and not contrary to a statute or rule of policy. 2 When, however,
1 Powell et al. v. Madison Safe Deposit & Trust Co. et al. (1935),

196

N. E. 324.

2 Gibbons v. Mahon (1890), 136 U. S. 549, 10 Sup. Ct. 1057; In re Robinson's Trust (1907), 218 Pa. St. 481, 67 At. 775.

